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INTRODUCTION
[T]he defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions,
or treatment is the right to change employers. When the master
can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obligation to go
on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive above to
relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.
Resulting depression of working conditions and living standards
affects not only the laborer under the system, but every other
with whom his labor comes in competition.1
In the spring of 2017, Congress faced a troublesome and pressing problem:
the statutory cap—a limit on the number of temporary, non-agricultural guest
workers admitted annually—had been reached earlier than expected.2 Pressure

* J.D. candidate, University of Wyoming, May 2019.
1

Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).

USCIS Reaches the H-2B Cap for Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV. (Mar.
16, 2017), http://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-reaches-h-2b-cap-fiscal-year-2017.
2
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built for an emergency expansion of the cap.3 People representing restaurants,
hotels, construction companies, and ski resorts claimed they would suffer
enormous losses if they could not rely on temporary workers, specifically H-2B
visa-holders, to meet their labor needs.4
Wyoming participated in the national conversation.5 Employers, especially in
Teton County, asserted an inability to fill positions with U.S. workers and urged
Congress to expand the number of available temporary non-agricultural guest
worker visas.6 On June 19, 2017, Congress released an additional 15,000 H-2B
visas as a one-time exception.7 Employers who wished to apply for temporary
laborers under one of these emergency visas were required to show that they
would suffer irreparable harm without additional H-2B workers.8 Due to the
cumbersome, lengthy procedure to acquire the visas, however, many businesses
did not receive help until after the end of the busiest summer months, rendering
the relief largely insufficient.9
Congress’s “one-time exception” response to industry’s loudest voices only
marginally alleviated an open wound: the U.S. non-agricultural guest worker
program.10 The burgeoning program annually funnels tens of thousands of
low-skilled laborers into jobs American laborers will not or cannot perform for
short periods of time; after the job ends, workers are supposed to return to their

3
Fred Bever, With Fewer Available H-2B Visas, Employers Struggle To Find Seasonal Workers,
NPR (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/03/28/520254684/with-fewer-available-h-2bvisas-employers-struggle-to-find-seasonal-workers; Miriam Jordan, Visa Shortage Spurs Vacancies, for
Jobs, at a Tourist Getaway, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/us/
summer-jobs-visas.html?_r=0.
4
Jennifer McDermott, Visa Crackdown Threatens Seasonal Help at US Resorts, U.S. NEWS
(May 2, 2017, 11:06 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/maine/articles/2017-05-02/
with-visas-tight-us-resorts-struggle-to-find-seasonal-help.
5
Demand for Seasonal Foreign Workers Increases in Wyoming, CASPER STAR TRIB. (July 14,
2017), http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/demand-for-seasonal-foreign-workers-increases-inwyoming/article_10ca634f-3c6b-50de-92a6-a0212f03746f.html.
6
Letter from H-2B Workforce Coal. to John F. Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
(May 10, 2017) (on file with U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
7
One-Time Increase in H-2B Nonimmigrant Visas for FY 2017, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERV. (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/
one-time-increase-h-2b-nonimmigrant-visas-fy-2017.
8

Id.

See, e.g., Jason Blevins, Colorado’s resorts, hurting for workers, applaud one-time increase
in visas but push for complete overhaul, DENVER POST (July 17, 2017, 6:29 PM), http://www.
denverpost.com/2017/07/17/resort-industry-colorado-applauds-one-time-increase-worker-visaspushes-overhaul-h2b-program/.
9

10
Daniel Costa, Frequently Asked Questions about the H-2B Temporary Foreign Worker
Program, ECON. POL’Y INST. 7 (June 2, 2016), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/108237.pdf [hereinafter
Costa, Frequently Asked Questions] (criticizing the DOL’s acknowledgement that its effort to protect
workers have “been under constant attack from powerful industry groups.”).
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countries of origin.11 Congress’s expansion of the program in 2017 barely
relieved American businesses even temporarily, and what relief the expansion
brought came at the expense of vulnerable migrants, particularly women, who
are not afforded the protections of other temporary work visas.12 By enacting
provisional measures, Congress allowed the H-2B visa program to continue
without addressing its deeper flaws.13 Additionally, between the insufficiency of
the current statutory cap and recent reform to the program that increases the
financial burden on participating employers, employers’ dissatisfaction with the
program may shift this type of work to another class of low-skilled workers, J-1
“cultural exchange” students.14
This comment first summarizes the historical and legislative context of the
temporary guest worker program and its split in 1986 into the H-2A and H-2B
categories.15 Next, it discusses the differences between the categories and examines
the gender-based problems inherent in the H-2B visa.16 Part IV analyzes the H-2B
visa program’s effects on Wyoming and its unique economy.17 Part V examines the
intersection of the H-2B system with the J-1 visa program and the unintended
consequences of the 2015 reform that effectively replaced one disposable labor
pool with another.18 Finally, this comment proposes fundamentally reforming
the H-2B program rather than sporadically expanding it, and advises Wyoming
employers against replacing their labor needs with under-regulated J-1 exchange
visitors.19 By expanding the length of the visa, creating an option for portability,
and constructing a pathway to citizenship, the H-2B could better serve guest
workers, U.S. workers, and U.S. employers alike—a change likely to have positive
impacts on the use of foreign labor in Wyoming.20

11
Foreign Labor Certification News, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., http://
www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/news/cfm (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
12

29 C.F.R. § 503.16 (2018).

Daniel Kowalski, H-2B Visas and the Making of an ‘Ultra Vires’ Regulation, LAW360
(July 25, 2017, 1:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/947267/h-2b-visas-and-the-makingof-an-ultra-vires-regulation.
13

Sabrina Balgamwalla, Jobs Looking for People, People Looking for their Rights: Seeking Relief
for Exploited Immigrant Workers in North Dakota, 91 N.D. L. REV. 483, 487– 89 (2015) [hereinafter
Balgamwalla, Jobs Looking for People]; Telephone Interview with Ali Stabler, Human Res. Dep’t.,
Jackson Hole Mountain Resort (Jan. 12, 2018); Email from Maximilian Weber, Human Res. &
Safety Compliance, Grand Targhee Resort (Jan. 10, 2018, 10:25 AM MST) (on file with author).
14

15

See infra notes 22–39 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 40 –151 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 152–64 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 165–210 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 211–31 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 211–31 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2018

3

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 18 [2018], No. 2, Art. 5

324

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 18

II. “CLOSE TO SLAVERY:”
A HISTORY OF TEMPORARY GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS 21
The long history of temporary labor programs in the U.S. is fraught with
abuse and marginalization.22 The Bracero program, enacted during World War
II to alleviate domestic labor shortages, reflected the traditional notion of maleinitiated family migration and placed men in agricultural laborer positions, despite
the reality that “[r]ural Mexican women . . . almost always work in the fields,
with livestock, and/or in crop-cleaning after the harvest.”23 Under that program,
which ended in 1964, more than 450,000 Mexican laborers—all men—entered
the U.S. annually for temporary work, and filled over 4.5 million jobs in the
U.S. economy over the duration of the program.24 Braceros suffered abuse at the
hands of their employers, including squalid living conditions, repressed wages,
long hours, and unsafe working conditions.25 Indeed, the Department of Labor
(DOL) likened the program to “legalized slavery.”26 Unfortunately, modern guest
worker programs, such as the H-2B visa program, perpetuate the same issues that
plagued the Braceros.27
President Ronald Reagan enacted the modern temporary guest worker
program in 1986 under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).28 IRCA
identifies temporary laborers as either agricultural (H-2A) or non-agricultural
(H-2B), and details the multi-agency application and certification process for
acquiring workers.29 Both visas allow a temporary laborer to enter the U.S. to

MARY BAUER & MEREDITH STEWART, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTPROGRAMS IN THE U.S. 1 (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/
d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/SPLC-Close-to-Slavery-2013.pdf.
21

WORKER

22
Dorothy E. Hill, Guest Worker Programs are no Fix for our Broken Immigration System:
Evidence from the Northern Mariana Islands, 41 N.M. L. REV. 131, 146–47 (2011) (describing
abuses under the Bracero program such as poor working conditions, depressed wages, and squalid
living conditions).

Anita Ortiz Maddali, Left Behind: The Dying Principle of Family Reunification Under
Immigration Law, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 107, 112–13 (2016); Tamar D. Wilson, Review: Mexican
Women’s Migration to the United States and the Politics of Patriarchy, 24 LATIN AM. PERSPECTIVES no.
5, 132–36 (1997).
23

24

Maddali, supra note 23, at 109 n.14; Hill, supra note 22, at 144–45.

25

See Hill, supra note 22, at 144–47 (including a succinct overview of the Bracero program).

Bauer & Stewart, supra note 21 (quoting Lee G. Williams in THEO J. MAJKA & PATRICK H.
MOONEY, FARMERS’ AND FARM WORKERS’ MOVEMENTS 152 (1995)).
26

27
See, e.g., Daniel Costa, Modern-day Braceros: The United States has 450,000 Guestworkers in
Low-Wage Jobs and Doesn’t Need More, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 31, 2017, 12:01 AM), http://www.
epi.org/blog/modern-day-braceros-the-united-states-has-450000-guestworkers-in-low-wage-jobs/.
28
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 301, 100 Stat.
3399 (1986).
29

Id.
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work for a single employer for a designated period of time, with no opportunity
for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residency.30
Temporary guest workers are placed with employers who have demonstrated
temporary need by showing either a one-time occurrence, a seasonal need,
a peakload need, or an intermittent need—categories defined by the nature,
seasonality, and duration of the workload.31 The employer must show that the
necessity for the guest worker will end in the “near, definable future” to qualify for
certification of a “temporary” visa.32 Frequently, H-2B guest workers fill positions
in logging, ski area work, crop harvesting, and amusement parks and carnivals—
all non-agricultural work that demands a temporary labor pool, or work that
simply does not exist outside of the designated season.33 Employers seeking H-2B
workers must also verify that “there are not enough U.S. workers who are able,
willing, qualified, and available to do the temporary work” and that hiring H-2B
workers “will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly
employed U.S. workers.”34 For many small or seasonal towns, or areas that do
not have a stable labor supply based on geographical remoteness, foreign labor is
essential to economic viability.35
Currently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the DOL, and
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) work together to
handle visa applications, labor certifications, and overall compliance with the
program.36 Although the H-2A category does not have a statutory cap, DHS
confines the H-2B visa category to 66,000 entrants annually.37 Until recently,
returning H-2B visa-holders were not included when calculating the statutory

30
H-2B Temporary Non-Agricultural Workers, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV. (Feb. 15,
2018), http://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-2b-temporary-nonagricultural-workers (explaining that H-2B visas are currently valid for up to one year and may be
renewed each year for up to three years, at which point the guest worker must leave the country for
at least three months before reapplying); Hill, supra note 22, at 133–34.

U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., GUIDANCE
PETITIONS (2016).
31

ON

“TEMPORARY NEED”

IN

H-2B

ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44849, H-2A AND H-2B TEMPORARY WORKER
VISAS: POLICY AND RELATED ISSUES 9 (2017).
32

OFFICE OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, ANNUAL REPORT 45–48 (2016), http://www.
foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/OFLC_Annual_Report_FY2016.pdf.
33

34

H-2B Temporary Non-Agricultural Workers, supra note 30.

See, e.g., Operating Hours and Seasons, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/yell/
planyourvisit/hours.htm (last updated Apr. 2, 2018); Jordan, supra note 3.
35

ASHWINI SUKTHANKAR, GLOB. WORKERS JUST. ALL., VISAS, INC.: CORPORATE CONTROL
POLICY INCOHERENCE IN THE U.S. TEMPORARY FOREIGN LABOR SYSTEM 29–31 (May 30,
2012) (outlining the roles different agencies play and criticizing the government’s oversight as
“uncoordinated and inefficient.”).
36

AND

37

Immigration and Nationality Act § 214(g)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(B) (2015).
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cap.38 In 2016, Congress began counting returning H-2B workers towards the
cap, a decision that drastically reduced the flow of non-agricultural guest workers
into the U.S. and contributed to the worker shortages in 2017.39

A. H-2A and H-2B: Ripe for Abuse
Procedurally, an employer must generally go through the same certification
process whether she is seeking H-2A or H-2B visas.40 The H-2B visa, however,
has far fewer procedural worker safeguards than those afforded to the H-2A visa,
despite reform to the H-2B program in 2015.41 Both categories of the H-2 visa have
been and continue to be broadly criticized; the DOL and the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) have acknowledged fundamental flaws, likening the
temporary guest worker program to a system of indentured servitude.42 Structural
deficiencies and lack of oversight contribute to the framework of exploitation, and
reports of abuse are likely far underrated.43

38
ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44306, THE H-2B VISA AND THE STATUTORY
CAP: IN BRIEF 4 (2015) [hereinafter BRUNO, THE H-2B VISA AND THE STATUTORY CAP] (noting the
provision had been implemented for fiscal year 2005 and 2006 and exempted H-2B workers who
had been counted in the cap in any of the previous three years).

Miriam Jordan, U.S. to Release Up to 15,000 New Visas for Seasonal Workers, N.Y. TIMES (July
17, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/homeland-security-to-release-up-to-15000new-seasonal-visas.html?_r=0; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FY 2016 NONIMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED
(stating the Department of State issued 84,627 total H-2B visas in 2016 and 61,128 of which came
from Mexico).
39

40
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., supra note 31; see supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
41
Compare Work Authorization for Non-U.S. Citizens: Temporary Agricultural Workers (H-2A
Visas), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Dec. 2016), http://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/elg/taw.htm#RRN (stating
employers sponsoring H-2A workers may be responsible for employee safeguards “concerning
recruitment, wages, housing, meals, transportation, workers’ compensation insurance, tools and
supplies, certification and recruitment fees, labor disputes, and other conditions”), with Work
Authorization for Non-U.S. Citizens: Temporary Agricultural Workers (H-2B Visas), U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR (Dec. 2016), http://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/elg/tnw.htm (stating employers sponsoring H-2B
workers are not responsible for housing or workers’ compensation insurance); BRUNO, THE H-2B
VISA AND THE STATUTORY CAP, supra note 38.
42
20 C.F.R. § 655.22(g) (rev’d Apr. 23, 2012) (“The Department is concerned that workers
who heavily indebt themselves to secure a place in the H-2B program may be subject to exploitation
in ways that would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers by creating
conditions akin to indentured servitude, driving down wages and working conditions for all
workers, foreign and domestic.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-154, H-2A AND
H-2B PROGRAMS: INCREASED PROTECTIONS NEEDED FOR FOREIGN WORKERS (2015).
43

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 37.
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1. Framework of Exploitation
The widespread commodification of foreign labor in the U.S. often results
in exploitation of guest workers before they even leave their countries of origin.44
This occurs because abusive recruitment tactics by “brokers” abroad, acting as
middlemen for U.S. employers, fall outside the purview of U.S. oversight.45
Brokers may charge exorbitant fees to connect often destitute workers with
desperate American employers, plunging workers into debt cycles that perpetuate
worker subjugation.46 Guest workers seeking jobs in the U.S. frequently borrow
money to arrange for travel, and, often, brokers require them to leave behind
“collateral” to ensure compliance with their job contracts while abroad.47 Reports
of brokers threatening to charge workers financial penalties if they violate their
employment contracts are not uncommon.48 Unfortunately, the quest for cheap
foreign labor is now so entrenched that the 2015 reform, which attempted to
broaden oversight and limit reliance on recruiters, falls short of disrupting current
migratory patterns and domestic dependencies.49
Because the H-2B system allows employers to exploit foreign labor and reap
inequitable economic benefits, many employers prefer it despite its regulatory

44
BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 34; Hill, supra note 22, at 188 (“[G]uest worker
programs treat migrants as commodities by design.”).

CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS MIGRANTE, RECRUITMENT REVEALED: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS
H-2 TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (2013), http://
www.cdmigrante.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Recruitment_Revealed.pdf; POLARIS PROJECT,
LABOR TRAFFICKING IN THE U.S.: A CLOSER LOOK AT TEMPORARY WORK VISAS 3 (2015), http://
polarisproject.org/sites/default/files/Temp%20Visa_v5%20%281%29.pdf; JUSTICE IN MOTION,
U.S. TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKER VISAS: H-2B 18–20 (2016), http://static1.squarespace.com/
static/57d09e5c5016e1b4f21c9bd3/t/58c32927db29d6bfd8cb56a4/1489185065974/VisaPages_
H2B_2015update.pdf (noting that recruiter information is not public and the government does
not have a system in place to monitor H-2B recruiters at the national level).
45

IN THE

46
COLLEEN OWENS ET AL., URBAN INST., UNDERSTANDING THE ORGANIZATION, OPERATION,
VICTIMIZATION PROCESS OF LABOR TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2014), http://www.
urban.org/research/publication/understanding-organization-operation-and-victimization-processlabor-trafficking-united-states/view/full_report; FREEDOM NETWORK, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND
TEMPORARY H-2 WORKERS 2–3 (2012), http://perma.cc/87PH-XLQB (addressing the issue of job
contractors hiring out workers by fraudulently obtaining certification and the lack of government
oversight into job brokers).

AND

47

29 C.F.R. § 503.16(j) (2015); OWENS ET AL., supra note 46, at 13.

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 11 (“It is almost inconceivable that a worker would
complain in any substantial way while a company agent holds the deed to the home where his wife
and children reside.”).
48

49
Foreign Labor Certification News, supra note 11 (describing the numbers of employers
filing for certification of H-2B workers as “unprecedented.”). The 2015 Final Wage Rule attempts
to improve transparency by requiring employers to disclose the use of foreign recruiters, but the
lack of communication between agencies render this provision largely inadequate. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 655.9 (2015).
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burdens.50 As a result, employers may intentionally misclassify employees as
H-2B workers.51 One reason employers might prefer the H-2B over the H-2A
is that the H-2B requires less ongoing financial obligation from the employer
to the employee.52 Furthermore, employers often misclassify the type of work
H-2B workers will perform, allowing them to pay workers at a lower prevailing
wage rate.53 Even so, “it’s hard to imagine that any business would go through
such a bureaucratic, expensive hassle unless they truly had a shortage of willing
workers,” or were incentivized by the promise of a cheap labor source.54 In any
event, intentional misclassification of workers as H-2Bs places otherwise qualified
individuals in a less-regulated and frequently less lucrative category.
Upon arrival in the U.S., the vulnerability of the foreign guest worker
reappears at the contract signing between worker and employer.55 Workers
sometimes are not allowed to review the job contract or do not understand
it.56 Sometimes, employers exaggerate or simply cannot accurately predict their
seasonal labor needs so, when workers arrive, they do not receive the work they
were promised.57 Until recently, H-2B workers did not have the “three-fourths
guarantee” that H-2A workers enjoy, which provides that employers must
guarantee employment for a total number of work hours equal to at least threefourths of the workdays in specific periods for both H-2B workers and workers in
corresponding employment.58

50
Jessica Garrison et al., The New American Slavery: Invited to the U.S., Foreign Workers Find a
Nightmare, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 24, 2015, 9:47 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/jessicagarrison/thenew-american-slavery-invited-to-the-us-foreign-workers-f#.ngYzvAXWB2 (“Kalen Fraser, a former
investigator for the Labor Department’s Wage and Hour Division who specialized in H-2 visa cases,
said that while some companies stumble over complex rules, a substantial portion ‘maliciously’
violate worker protection laws.”).
51

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 9–13.

The H-2B Temporary Foreign Worker Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
& the Nat’l Interest of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 11–13 (2016) [hereinafter Hearing]
(including the statement of Daniel Costa, Dir. of Immigr. Law and Pol’y Res., Econ. Pol’y Inst.).
52

53

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 23 –24.

Alexia F. Campbell, Many Americans Want Work, but They Don’t Want to Mow Lawns, THE
ATLANTIC (July 11, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/why-the-guysmowing-your-lawn-are-probably-foreign/490595/.
54

55

29 C.F.R. § 503.16 (2015).

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 23. Such deficiencies in the formation of these
contracts raise additional issues related to their validity, such as undue influence, capacity, and
duress. See id. However, a discussion of their legality is beyond the scope of this paper.
56

57
Id. at 22 (“The DOL’s inspector general found in 2004 that the North Carolina Growers
Association overstated both its need for workers and the length of the period of employment.”).
58

29 C.F.R. § 503.16(f ).
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The reform in 2015 attempted to address the wage and hour abuses that
have consistently plagued the H-2B visa category.59 Although many of these
provisions will protect guest worker wages, employers still retain disproportionate
control over those wages.60 For example, according to the 2015 Final Wage Rule,
employers must pay H-2B workers the “calculated rate” based on DOL data for
that occupation.61 However, employers may easily substitute independent surveys
to establish the mean wage for the occupation in their relevant geographical
location if they meet several minimal criteria.62 Thus, the Final Wage Rule allows
employers to pay workers rates that are lower than rates based on DOL data.63 On
top of that, some employers frequently discriminate based on race, paying different
wages to H-2B workers depending on their country of origin.64 Underpaying
H-2B workers not only increases debt servitude, but also undermines domestic
laborers by incentivizing employers to look to foreign guest workers rather than
the U.S. labor force.65
Compared to workers in other visa categories, H-2B workers lack significant
health and safety protections and are at a significantly greater risk of trafficking.66
The use of noncitizen labor in dangerous workplaces shifts the costs of health

59
Save Our Small and Seasonal Businesses Act, S. 2225, 114th Cong. (2015); Roy Maurer,
New Rules Revamp H-2B Visa Program, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. (May 6, 2015), http://
www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/pages/new-rules-revamp-h2b-visaprogram.aspx (noting that employers are now required to increase the number of hours per week
required for full time employment, adhere to the three-fourths guarantee, pay visa and related fees
of H-2B workers, and provide employees with copies of the job order and earnings statements,
including deductions); BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 18; Jimenez v. GLK Foods LLC, No.
12-CV-209, 2016 WL 2997498, at *15 –17 (E.D. Wis. May 23, 2016); Rosiles-Perez v. Super.
Forestry Serv., Inc., 250 F.R.D. 332, 339, 345–47 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).
60

Maurer, supra note 59.

61

20 C.F.R. § 655.10 (2015).

DANIEL COSTA, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE H-2B TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKER PROGRAM: FOR
LABOR SHORTAGES OR CHEAP, TEMPORARY LABOR? 26 (2016) [hereinafter COSTA, LABOR SHORTAGES];
Hearing, supra note 52, at 13–16 (noting how use of private wage surveys was a systematic response
by H-2B employers to undermine wage rules and keep H-2B wages low).
62

Interim Final Rule: Temporary Non-agricultural Employment of H-2B Aliens in the United
States, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., http://www.dol.gov/whd/immigration/H2BFinal
Rule/index.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2018); Maurer, supra note 59.
63

64
INT’L LABOR RECRUITMENT WORKING GRP., THE AMERICAN DREAM UP FOR SALE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR ENDING INTERNATIONAL LABOR RECRUITMENT ABUSE 14 (2013) (citing CastellanosContreras v. Decatur Hotels, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010)) (revealing a hotel’s application to the
DOL that sought to pay Bolivians $6.02 per hour, Dominicans $6.09 per hour, and Peruvians
$4.49 per hour).
65

Maurer, supra note 59.

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 25; Stephen Greenhouse, C.J.’s Seafood Fined for Labor
Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/business/cjs-seafoodfined-for-labor-abuses.html (describing gross health and safety violations); POLARIS PROJECT, supra
note 45, at 1.
66
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services from the employer onto the community.67 H-2B’s workers’ compensation
depends on state law, which often precludes non-immigrants from seeking redress
for job-related injuries.68 Similarly, unlike H-2A workers, H-2B workers are not
eligible for many federally-funded legal services, such as legal aid.69
Additionally, in contrast to H-2A workers, H-2B workers have no federal
housing protection, leading some employers to view housing as a potential “profit
center.”70 Often, available housing for H-2B workers is in remote locations;
sometimes it is guarded.71 In a recent case, hundreds of Indian H-2B workers
sued their employer alleging, inter alia, violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act after paying between $11,000 and
$25,000 in recruitment fees to live in “man camps” guarded by armed soldiers.72
Housing sometimes lacks beds, cooking facilities, and adequate restrooms.73 The
lack of DOL regulations means that nothing prevents an employer from charging
unreasonable rent to H-2B workers, the imposition of which may significantly
reduce workers’ promised wages and increase their indebtedness to the employer.74
Most importantly, because the H-2B visa is linked to a sponsoring employer,
workers cannot quit or find other employment if their jobs are unsuitable, and
they are much less likely than a citizen at-will employee to file a complaint with
their sponsoring employers.75 This lack of portability traps vulnerable guest
workers in potentially abusive work environments with no opportunity for

Anne T. Gallagher, Note, Counteracting the Bias: The Department of Labor’s Unique
Opportunity to Combat Human Trafficking, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1012, 1015 (2013).
67

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 25; see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-102(a)(vii)
(2017) (allowing a broad definition of “employee” that could easily exclude H-2B workers by
categorizing them as aliens).
68

69

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 43.

70

See supra note 45 and accompanying text; BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 36.

71

Id. at 32, 37.

David v. Signal Int’l, 37 F. Supp. 3d 822 (2014); Rachel Luban, Jury Awards Guestworkers
Over $14 Million in Landmark Human Trafficking, Forced Labor Case, IN THESE TIMES (Feb. 19,
2015, 10:27 AM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/17657/guestworkers_new_orleans.
72

Luban, supra note 72 (noting that workers alleged their trailers were overcrowded and
lacked sufficient toilets and sanitation); Jessica Garrison et al., “All You Americans Are Fired.”,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/jessicagarrison/all-you-americans-arefired?utm_term=.bpbAq1Y9y#.oxPgGWEJo (describing workers paying nearly $300 a month to
live in rotting school buses with no plumbing).
73

74

Garrison et al., supra note 73; BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 35.

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(D) (2016); see SUKTHANKAR, supra note 36, at 47 (describing how
quitting will lead to deportable status); Arthur N. Read, Learning from the Past: Designing Effective
Worker Protections for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 423,
443 (2007) (acknowledging that lack of portability is “one of the most severe problems of the
existing H-2A and H-2B programs.”).
75
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alternative employment.76 An employer can threaten to deport the guest worker
or call Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and employers frequently
hold workers’ documentation, including passports and social security cards.77
The vulnerability of being tied to a single employer also increases guest worker
susceptibility to human trafficking; one recent study of guest worker trafficking
victims found that coercion in the form of document seizure was present in 64%
of cases.78

2. A Department’s Duty, Disregarded
The lack of DOL oversight amplifies the risks faced by H-2B workers.79
Between 1975 and 2004, DOL enforcement activities and resources “either
stagnated or declined” as the workforce grew.80 Even after the DOL hired 250
new Wage and Hour Department (WHD) investigators in 2010, only 1,200
WHD agents are currently tasked with “protecting the labor and employment
rights of 150 million workers—which includes all H-2B workers and Americans
who work in H-2B occupations.” 81 Moreover, the H-2B program receives far
less attention than the H-2A program. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) reported that between 2009 and 2013, over 90% of DOL investigations
involved the H-2A category rather than the H-2B category, despite the H-2B
program having twice the number of reported labor violations as the H-2A.82
Financial and budgetary constraints alone, however, do not justify the lack of
oversight; policy concerns and institutionalized gender bias regarding noncitizens
may contribute to the lack of attention and funding in this area. Despite
reporting to the correct authority, a victim of H-2B abuse may be considered a
mere “gray-area” case—subject to labor abuse but not rising to the level of “severe”
trafficking.83 As such, “the government’s approach has been to treat the gray76
Read, supra note 75, at 443. The problem is not limited to the H-2 visa program, but
also extends to other temporary guest worker programs. See FREEDOM NETWORK, supra 46, at 2
(“Although the recruitment or mode of entry of the temporary worker to the U.S. is not necessarily
conducted illegally, the manner in which the H-2 visas tie the employee’s livelihood and legal status
to their employers can easily create situations of subordination and exploitation, often found in
cases of trafficking involving undocumented workers.”).
77
POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 45, at 4; OWENS ET AL., supra note 46, at 89–90; BAUER &
STEWART, supra note 21, at 2; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 37–38.
78
OWENS ET AL., supra note 46, at vii, 70 (reporting in one survey that 71% of trafficking
victims entered the U.S. on temporary visas).
79
Garrison et al., supra note 50 (“The Labor Department noted . . . that it has limited
resources, with only about 1,000 investigators to enforce protections for all 135 million workers in
the U.S.”).
80

Hill, supra note 22, at 154.

81

Costa, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10.

82

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 36, 47.

Jennifer M. Chacon, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of
Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1623–24, 1628–29 (2010).
83
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area case as one involving a voluntary migrant who is not eligible for the
protections available to trafficking victims.”84 Thus, even if the DOL were to
improve its reporting mechanisms, a lack of adequate judicial redress limits guest
worker reporting.85
Incentives for employees to report abuses are minimal, as are incentives
for employers to comply with workplace and wage and hour regulations.86
The DOL only loosely monitors H-2B employers and has failed to sanction
known violators.87 Employers are rarely suspended or prevented from continued
participation in the guest worker program; in 2009, only five out of approximately
7,300 employers seeking to employ H-2B workers were temporarily barred from
doing so.88 Inadequate sanctioning by the DOL perpetuates the patterns of abuse
endemic to the H-2B program and allows unscrupulous employers to continue
using exploitative or illegal practices without any genuine fear of governmental
reprimand.89

B. Discrimination against U.S. Workers
Practices surrounding the H-2B visa affect individuals beyond afflicted
foreign guest workers. U.S. employers, who have grown reliant on decades of
steady, cheap labor in the form of temporary non-agricultural guest workers,
have also become accustomed to the gaps in oversight and financial benefits of
the program.90 To preserve the status quo, employers are known to deter U.S.
workers from applying for the positions they seek to have filled by H-2B visas.91
In contrast to H-2B workers, U.S. workers are typically more mobile, more aware
of their rights, and protected by legislation that covers the workplace.92 As a result,
84

Id.

85

See infra note 148 and accompanying text.

86

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 34–38.

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 38–39 (“According to a comprehensive list of DOL
compliance actions, the Department cited only 27 H-2B employers for violations between 2007
and 2012. Given that the DOL certifies thousands of employers for H-2B workers each year, this
indicates that the DOL is not likely conducting many investigations into program abuse.”); see also
Ken Bensinger et al., The Pushovers, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 12, 2016 2:06 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.
com/kenbensinger/the-pushovers?utm_term=.itxKpk31M#.fbGnGOQKP (“There is almost
no work-place offense so extreme that the U.S. government will not reward employers with the
opportunity to do it again.”); Hill, supra note 22, at 154.
87

88

Hill, supra note 22, at 153.

89

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 38–40.

See SUKTHANKAR, supra note 36, at 39 (noting that the “economic displacement of U.S.
workers . . . is now far too entrenched to reverse easily.”).
90

91

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 51.

Hearing, supra note 52, at 16 (“American workers who have access to basic labor standards
and the social safety net, and who can accept a job offer from an employer across town who offers a
higher wage, are less appealing than workers who can’t complain, look for another job, or demand a
higher wage.”).
92
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the GAO has found that some employers “preferentially hired H-2B workers over
American workers in violation of federal law.”93
The 2015 reform attempted to create more rigorous domestic recruiting
requirements for U.S. employers, but such provisions are not difficult to bypass;
in fact, “[a]dvertising for H-2B job orders is essential a formality.”94 Although
employers are required to advertise the job order in the U.S., many employers
intending to import H-2B workers advertise in locations distant from the
job site or advertise long before the job begins.95 Others misrepresent the job
requirements, schedule interviews at inconvenient times, or have applicants
perform unnecessarily grueling physical labor during interviews, in attempts to
deter the local workforce from applying.96 Consequently, “American workers are
overlooked in their own communities because of the H-2B program.” 97
H-2B regulations require employers to hire every qualified American worker
who applies for the position before the DOL will certify their request for foreign
labor.98 However, employers use abusive recruitment tactics and partnerships with
foreign recruiters who pick workers based on race, nationality, gender, and age,
to effectively mask their efforts to weed out domestic workers and hire cheaper
foreign laborers.99 Additionally, after an employer has gone to the expense of filing
an application for temporary labor certification with the DOL, it is unlikely that
she will enthusiastically pursue recruitment efforts; if qualified Americans do
apply, the employer’s application fees will be lost.100 In the landscaping industry,
for example, employers “saved an average of $2.59 per hour in 2014 by hiring an
H-2B worker rather than a U.S. worker earning the average wage for landscaping,”
and almost all H-2B industries reflect similar savings.101 Faced with such savings,

93

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 31.

DAVID SEMINARA, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDIES, DIRTY WORK: IN-SOURCING AMERICAN JOBS
H-2B GUESTWORKERS 13 (Jan. 15, 2010), http://cis.org/Dirty-Work-InSourcing-AmericanJobs-H2B-Guestworkers.
94

WITH

95
20 C.F.R. § 655.40 –.48 (2018); In re Amsol, Inc., No. 2008-INA-00112, 2009 WL
2869970, at *8 –9 (Bd. Alien Lab. Cert. App., Dec. 1, 2015); SEMINARA, supra note 94, at 12–14
(describing the ways employers circumvent the recruitment period).
96

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 31.

97

Hearing, supra note 52, at 16.

98

29 C.F.R. § 503.16(t) (2015).

INT’L LABOR RECRUITMENT WORKING GRP., supra note 64, at 12–15 (detailing the
extensive tactics employers and recruiters use to “sort workers into jobs and visa categories based on
racialized and gendered notions of work.”); Gabriel Thompson, The Big, Bad Business of Fighting
Guestworker Rights, THE NATION (July 3, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/168715/big-badbusiness-fighting-guest-worker-rights#.
99

100

Garrison et al., supra note 73.

101

Costa, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10, at 4–5.
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employers’ push for H-2B workers is understandable.102 Neither the DOL nor
DHS allocates funds for oversight of the H-2B program, part of which could be
directed toward recruitment efforts.103 Because of this, qualified U.S. laborers face
systemic disadvantages.
Moreover, employing noncitizens—whether H-2Bs, trafficked, or
unauthorized workers—depresses wages, because employers do not have equivalent
financial obligations to noncitizens as they do to citizens, and may legally underpay
them.104 Employers may save several dollars per hour by employing H-2B workers
over citizens, making the citizen labor less valuable and reducing wages within the
industry.105 Furthermore, as wages decline because guest workers cannot advocate
for better working conditions and benefits, the desirability of the work among
U.S. workers wanes, creating a vacuum for even more non-citizen labor.106 U.S.
workers may also be subjected to more dangerous workplace environments.107 If
employers circumvent health and safety regulations, knowing that their temporary
guest workers may be too afraid to speak up against violations, all employees
suffer as a result.108

C. The H-2B System and U.S. Employers
For those U.S. employers who choose not to exploit guest workers, navigating
the regulations of the program is complicated, burdensome, and expensive.109
Since the 2015 reform, however—laudable in its attempt to increase employer
investment in the program—employers have retreated from the H-2B program.110
Employers in Teton County, Wyoming cited the financial burden of the program
as the primary reason for shifting away from using H-2B workers to fill temporary
low-skilled jobs.111

102

Id.

103

SEMINARA, supra note 94, at 14.

104

Gallagher, supra note 67, at 1014–15; Hearing, supra note 52, at 1, 11, 16.

105

Costa, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10, at 4–5.

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 21 (noting that in 2011, “the DOL itself determined
that the current H-2B wage rule degraded the wages of U.S. workers.”).
106

107

Gallagher, supra note 67, at 1015.

108

Id.

Interview with Rosie Read, Esq., Trefonas Law, in Jackson, Wyo. (Jan. 3, 2018); see also
JILL H. WILSON, BROOKINGS INST., IMMIGRATION FACTS: TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKERS (2013), http://
www.brookings.edu/research/immigration-facts-temporary-foreign-workers/; Campbell, supra
note 54.
109

SUKTHANKAR, supra note 36, at 9 (noting that as one visa becomes more burdensome,
employers tend to shift to other labor sources to fill that deficit).
110

Interview with Rosie Read, supra note 109 (noting that the new timeline and truncated
windows for applying for the visas create uncertainty for employers and may lead to lost costs
if applications are not certified); Telephone Interview with Ali Stabler, supra note 14; Telephone
111
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The instability of the temporary guest worker program contributes to
employers’ dissatisfaction.112 The politicization of the program subjects it to the
whims of different industry leaders, leaving many business owners struggling
to keep up with the ever-changing deadlines, caps, and processes for securing
temporary low-skilled labor.113 Moreover, employers usually cannot predict
how quickly the statutory cap will be met, creating a seasonal “scramble” to file
petitions by deadlines with no guarantee that the petitions will be approved.114
The time and investment an employer may direct to applications, recruitment
efforts, and visa processing may be for naught if the statutory cap is reached before
her request for temporary labor has been reviewed by the DOL.115

III. GENDER-BASED PROBLEMS WITH THE H-2B VISA
In addition to being at risk of the generalized abuses of the H-2B program,
female guest workers experience further discrimination based on their gender.116
Despite recent reform, the non-agricultural guest worker program remains the
least-protected of the H-2 visa categories and abuses against women are welldocumented.117 Often forced into the lesser-paying H-2B category based on
the feminization of household work, women lose out on the better wages and
additional safeguards of the H-2A visa.118 “Whereas the [B]racero program
selected men and ignored women, flexible industrialization in the United States
has created a demand for women’s labor.”119 Both H-2 visas, reflecting roots in
the Bracero program, presumed men would be the primary migrants, but this
structure has outgrown its mold.

Interview with Claudia Palzkill, Human Res. Dep’t, Teton Mountain Lodge (Jan. 11, 2018); Email
from Colleen Dubbee, Wyo. Dep’t of Workforce Servs. (Jan. 17, 2018, 11:35 AM MST) (on file
with author).
Costa, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10, at 3–4, 7 (critiquing the practice of
changing H-2B policy through appropriations riders, which can alter the requirements for employers
without their notice and input).
112

113

Foreign Labor Certification News, supra note 11; Email from Colleen Dubbee, supra note 111.

114

Telephone Interview with Keith Pabian, Esq., Keith Pabian Law, LLC (Jan. 22, 2018).

115

Foreign Labor Certification News, supra note 11.

JAYESH RATHOD & ADRIENNE LOCKIE, AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF LAW & CENTRO DE LOS
DERECHOS MIGRANTE, INC., PICKED APART: THE HIDDEN STRUGGLES OF MIGRANT WORKER WOMEN
IN THE MARYLAND CRAB INDUSTRY 15 (2010).
116

OWENS ET AL., supra note 46, at 8 (summarizing years of studies that show victims of labor
abuses tend to be “female, racial and ethnic minorities, and born outside the United States.”).
117

118

RATHOD & LOCKIE, supra note 116, at 23–26.

119

Wilson, supra note 23, at 132–36.
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A. Guest Worker Gender Discrimination on a National Scale
Procedurally, discrimination may first appear through intentional
misclassification of women as H-2Bs.120 Employers often seek workers in the
H-2B category because it requires less of the employer than the more stringent
H-2A regulations.121 But women are further targeted as more “suited” for H-2B
work, and some companies systematically place men in H-2A jobs while putting
women in H-2B jobs.122 In 2010, women workers in the higher-paying H-2A
category reflected just 3.7% of the labor pool despite representing roughly 40%
of the applicant pool.123 The institutionalized bias inherent in the H-2B visa that
places men in more standardized, higher-paying jobs relegates women to more
dangerous and often underpaid positions.124
Immigrant women are already the lowest-paid demographic in the American
workforce.125 By steering women away from H-2A visas, employers avoid
paying women the higher wages associated with H-2A visas along with other
perks required by law, such as housing, further adding to this compensation
imbalance.126 Such categorical exclusion creates downward pressure on wages,
as the guest worker program establishes an extremely low floor for pay.127 Wage
and tip theft, denial of breaks, and minimum wage violations in the hospitality
and restaurant industries occur more frequently to women, people of color, and
undocumented immigrants.128 A Hispanic female, then, is truly at the bottom of
the barrel; her situation only worsens if she falls out of immigration status.129

120

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 31–33.

121

RATHOD & LOCKIE, supra note 116, at 5.

Id.; BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 32 (citing Olvera-Morales v. Sterling Onions, Inc.,
322. F. Supp. 2d. 211 (N.D. N.Y. 2004)) (finding the likelihood that gender-based granting of visas
was due to chance was less than one in 10,000); Michelle Chen, How Temporary Work Visas Hurt
Migrant Women, THE NATION (Nov. 7, 2017), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-temporarywork-visas-hurt-migrant-women/.
122

123

SUKTHANKAR, supra note 36, at 9.

Chen, supra note 122; see also Joan Fitzpatrick & Katrina R. Kelly, Gendered Aspects of
Migration: Law and the Female Migrant, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 75 (1998).
124

125
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, IMMIGRANT WOMEN
DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY 8 (2014).

IN THE

UNITED STATES: A PORTRAIT

OF

126
Olvera-Morales, 322 F. Supp. 2d. at 214–15; Jimenez v. GLK Foods LLC, No. 12-CV-209,
2016 WL 2997498, at *11, 17 (E.D. Wis. May 23, 2016); Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels,
LLC, 622 F.3d 393, 403 –04 (5th Cir. 2010).
127
Maria L. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment: Challenging Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 928, 930 (2007).
128

OWENS ET AL., supra note 46, at 14.

AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 125, at 8 (noting Mexican women comprised more
than a quarter of all female immigrants and had the lowest wages of all female immigrant groups
in 2012).
129
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Female guest workers are also at greater risk of sexual harassment and
assault while on the job, although both male and female H-2Bs experience such
violations.130 Further, sexual abuse is more likely to be directed at female domestic
workers than females employed in other H-2B industries, a factor that warrants
scrutiny given the heavy reliance on housekeepers and maids in Wyoming.131
Gaps in documentation of harassment are compounded by language barriers and,
in some cases, the difficulty of less acculturated women understanding sexual
harassment as a concept, including how to report it and a lack of understanding of
legal rights.132 Psychological pressure to remain in a job, combined with the shame
of an assault and fear of retaliation, create difficulty in accurately compiling data
on the subject.133 For their part, employers have demonstrated a continual failure
to address sexual harassment and sexual assault complaints of H-2B women.134
The lack of portability inherent in the H-2B visa also has special implications for women.135 If a woman’s employment is unsuitable, her “options” are
limited: she may either remain in the U.S. to try to find another job, illegally,
or return home.136 Women cannot find reasonably remunerative, non-degrading
jobs in the informal economy.137 This current model not only exposes women
to the risks associated with being an undocumented female in an unregulated
economy but also contributes to greater numbers of immigrants present in the
U.S. without documentation.138
By leaving an abusive employer and entering the informal sector, a woman’s
labor rights do not improve except that she may have more discretion in choosing

Irma M. Waugh, Examining the Sexual Harassment Experiences of Mexican Immigrant
Farmworking Women, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 237 (2010) (stating that 80% of 150 women
interviewed reported some form of sexual harassment while on the job); Kristi L. Graunke, “Just
Like One of the Family”: Domestic Violence Paradigms and Combating On-The-Job Violence Against
Household Workers in the United States, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 131, 152–56 (2002).
130

131

OWENS ET AL., supra note 46, at 90; see infra note 155 and accompanying text.

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 33; OWENS ET AL., supra note 46, at 201 (noting “very
few” women understood their labor rights).
132

133
RATHOD & LOCKIE, supra note 116; see Balgamwalla, Jobs Looking for People, supra note
14, at 489–90; Michael Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667,
679 (2003).
134

BAUER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 34 –35.

135

Graunke, supra note 130, at 154–56.

136
Ontiveros, supra note 127, at 927– 28 (quitting may be a non-option due to concerns
regarding time spent in deportation processing, the dangers of an illegal border crossing, and the
possibility of abuse from “coyotes” or guides); FREEDOM NETWORK, supra note 46.
137
Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 124, at 49 (“The result is economic vulnerability and
exposure to violence and sexual exploitation.”).
138

See id. at 102– 09; Hill, supra note 22, at 186.
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her employer.139 Working as an undocumented migrant, of course, is not without
risk.140 87.9% of workers who enter the private sector as domestic servants face
employer documentation seizure, as opposed to 37.6% of agricultural workers.141
Furthermore, a woman who leaves her sponsoring employer may face additional
barriers related to housing: “[a]lthough it may appear that there are more shelter
options for women, these shelters are usually designated for victims of domestic
violence, and female victims of labor trafficking may be turned away.”142 If a
woman falls into undocumented status by leaving an abusive H-2B employer,
her only option for shelter might be an immigration detention facility.143 A
woman lucky enough to access a local shelter may face retaliation from her former
employer or trafficker in the form of stalking and harassment, especially if her job
site was in a remote location, as many H-2B placements are.144

B. Immigration Law’s Outdated Mold and Wyoming’s Modern Reality
The assumption that women are exclusively beneficiaries of their spouses’
visas and would not apply themselves for temporary guest worker visas—or
visas of any kind, beyond the H-4 dependent spouse visa—has pervaded U.S.
immigration policy since its inception.145 Female agency as it relates to economic or
non-domestic labor traditionally has been subsumed under notions of coverture,
which terminated a woman’s legal personhood upon marriage to a male, who
would also serve as the legal head of household.146 The progression of women’s
rights and women’s firm advancement in the American workforce have catapulted
women far beyond this notion. Unfortunately, the immigration realm has been
slow to catch up.147 In the rare instances where the law has drawn near to modern

Hill, supra note 22, at 185–86. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that
“unauthorized workers, who have more job mobility, are less vulnerable to abuse than guest
workers.” Id.
139

140
OWENS ET AL., supra note 46, at 9 (reporting that 85% of undocumented immigrants who
encountered problems with their working conditions in the prior twelve months did not complain
because they feared their immigration status would be used against them).
141

Id. at 70 –71.

142

Id. at 125.

143

Id. at 126.

144

Id. at 127–28; see also, e.g., RATHOD & LOCKIE, supra note 116, at 17–18.

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(i)(F)(9)(B)(iv) (2018) (describing the H-4 visa, which allows a primary
H visa holder to bring an eligible accompanying family member to the U.S.); Wilson, supra note
23, at 132–36; Sabrina Balgamwalla, Bride and Prejudice: How U.S. Immigration Law Discriminates
Against Spousal Visa Holders, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 25, 36 (2014) [hereinafter
Balgamwalla, Bride and Prejudice].
145

146

Balgamwalla, Bride and Prejudice, supra note 145, at 25, 36.

Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 124, at 50 (lamenting academia’s treatment of female
migrants as “passive reactors who simply follow a male migrant” rather than “active participants
who seek to shape their own destinies and better their lives.”).
147
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trends that reflect present female migrants’ reality, such developments take the
form of casting women as victims.148
“In many ways, debates over immigration reform have been about
conceptualizing female immigrants beyond their role as wives (or later on, as
victims).”149 Immigration law today does not align with the steady trend of
women actively seeking H-2B visas and leaving their home countries, with or
without a male partner.150 The vestiges of a system that marginalizes women only
serve to hinder women’s agency in making migratory decisions and devalue their
economic contributions to U.S. communities.151
Wyoming exemplifies the new reality, where migrant women—far from
being passive bystanders—are productive and active participants in the state’s
workforce. Wyoming’s unique economy makes the H-2B visa an attractive, and
often necessary, option for employers seeking laborers to perform the “3-D jobs:
dirty, dangerous, and difficult.”152 But the women who fill these positions in the
tourist hubs of the state face the same discriminatory measures that plague the
H-2B program nationally.153 In 2015, the top five occupations certified by the
DOL’s Employment and Training Administration (ETA) included landscaping
and groundskeeping workers, forest and conservation workers, amusement
and recreation attendants, maids and housekeeping cleaners, and construction
laborers.154 In Wyoming, however, maids and housekeeping cleaners are the
most common H-2B visa occupations and, in 2015, filled 131 of 351 H-2B visa
positions certified statewide.155 Wyoming is the fifth-largest sponsor of H-2B

148
See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 807, 127
Stat. 54 (2013) (providing a path to citizenship for women who can show abuse at the hands of a
citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b) (providing a path to citizenship
for victims of certain crimes).
149

Balgamwalla, Bride and Prejudice, supra note 145, at 54.

150

Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 124, at 52 n.17; Maddali, supra note 23, at 116.

Balgamwalla, Bride and Prejudice, supra note 145, at 54–55 (commenting that even modern
immigration law’s “veneer” of gender-neutral terms “does not disguise the fact that these roles are
cast according to the doctrine of coverture and the traditional role of women as wives.”).
151

152
Hill, supra note 22, at 134 n.13 (citing PHILIP L. MARTIN
MIGRATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 83 (2006)).

ET AL.,

MANAGING LABOR

153
Donna Playton & Stacey L. Obrecht, Wyoming Energy Symposium: High Times in
Wyoming: Reflecting the State’s Values by Eliminating Barriers and Creating Opportunities for Women
in the Equality State, 7 WYO. L. REV. 295, 301– 02 (2007) (describing Wyoming’s wage gap as
one of the worst in the nation); OFFICE OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT
49 (2015) (identifying the top three cities in Wyoming that host H-2B visas as Jackson, Teton
Village, and Cody, where wages range between $22,554.13 and $31,548.40); NEW AM. ECON., THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF NEW AMERICANS IN WYOMING 7 (2016), http://research.newamericaneconomy.
org/report/the-contributions-of-new-americans-in-wyoming/.
154

OFFICE OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, supra note 153, at 49.

155

Id. at 106; NEW AM. ECON., supra note 153, at 9.
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housekeeping workers nationally, reflecting an enormous shortage of citizen labor
in the state’s top tourist destinations.156 Although no federal agency disaggregates
H-2B data by gender, 95% household workers in the U.S. are women.157
Wyoming employers save $1.04 in hourly wages for every housekeeper
certified under the H-2B visa.158 Given the high cost of living in Teton County,
finding a labor source that requires no housing coverage and involves little
governmental oversight may capture the attention of businesses who have the
means to go through the bulky certification process. Yet in this race to the bottom,
H-2B housekeeping workers in Wyoming may cease to exist as “guests” and may
instead only be viewed as a savvy method to cut employer costs.
Because “immigrants frequently gravitate toward sectors in which employers
may struggle to find enough interested U.S.-born workers,” in Wyoming,
noncitizens represent a disproportionate segment of the low-skilled industry.159
Foreign-born maids and housekeepers represent 27% of Wyoming’s entire
housekeeping industry; foreign-born dishwashers represent 37% of the industry.160
Wage withholding and unsafe working conditions, therefore, may impact not
just visa-holders, but domestic American workers in the industry as well.161
Additionally, noncitizens in Wyoming are six times more likely than natives to
have less than a high-school education—a factor that further compounds the
potential for exploitation, especially for women, who are already marginalized in
the workforce.162
In contrast to Wyoming’s sluggish state population growth, Wyoming’s
immigrant population has grown by 41% in just four years.163 Immense economic
benefits have followed: in 2014, the immigrant population wielded $449 million
in spending power, paid $30.2 million in Wyoming state taxes, and contributed
over $74 million to Social Security and Medicaid.164 To ignore the financial
contributions that women undoubtedly supply to Wyoming’s economy and
workforce is to devalue not just their labor, but also their inherent agency.

156

COSTA, LABOR SHORTAGES, supra note 62, at 38.

JUST. IN MOTION, U.S. TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKER VISAS: H-2B, supra note 45, at 38;
LINDA BURNHAM & NIK THEODORE, NAT’L DOM. WORKERS ALL., HOME ECONOMICS: THE INVISIBLE
AND UNREGULATED WORLD OF DOMESTIC LABOR 41 (2012).
157

158

COSTA, LABOR SHORTAGES, supra note 62, at 38.

159

NEW AM. ECON., supra note 153, at 7– 8.

160

Id. at 9.

161

See supra notes 90 –108 and accompanying text.

162

COSTA, LABOR SHORTAGES, supra note 62, at 6.

163

NEW AM. ECON., supra note 153, at 1.

164

Id. at 4 –5.
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IV. UNINTENDED BURDEN-SHIFTING TO THE J-1 VISA PROGRAM
The bipartisan reform introduced in 2015 addressed several longstanding
deficiencies of the H-2B program and was praised for its pro-worker approach.165
After the reform, H-2B workers now enjoy the three-fourths guarantee, an
important measure in advancing wage protection.166 Employers must pay H-2B
workers the highest of the prevailing wage or the federal, state, or local minimum
wage, and are now required to cover transportation costs of the guest worker to
and from her country of origin and the job site.167 Although the reform left many
issues unresolved, such as gender discrimination and lack of adequate redress in
the face of abuse, the reform at least facially acknowledged some of the program’s
many flaws.168
However, the 2015 reform fails to strike a balance between affording greater
protection to guest workers and incentivizing or streamlining the process for
employers.169 In fact, the protracted timeline, complex procedural requirements,
and financial burden in application and certification has deterred some employers,
including those in Teton County, from using the program.170 When one visa
becomes less accessible, employers turn to other easily exploitable visa categories
to fill labor needs.171 Through the backlash it created, the reform prompted
employers to seek out seasonal, temporary labor from other disposable pools of
migrants.172 Chief among these alternatives is the J-1 visa program.

A. Burden-Shifting in a New Era of Labor Reform
The J-1 Visa, housed under the purview of the Department of State (DOS),
includes fifteen different categories intended to foster “global understanding
through educational and cultural exchanges.”173 Created in 1961 in an effort to

Save Our Small and Seasonal Businesses Act, S. 2225, 114th Cong. § 4(b)(F)(i), (c),
(e) (2015); Laura D. Francis, DHS, DOL Issue Interim H-2B Rule, Add More Worker Protections,
Transparency, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.bna.com/dhs-dol-issue-n17179925907/.
165

See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also BRUNO, THE H-2B VISA
STATUTORY CAP, supra note 38, at 2.
166

167

BRUNO, THE H-2B VISA AND THE STATUTORY CAP, supra note 38, at 2.

168

See supra notes 120– 44 and accompanying text.

169

See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.

AND THE

29 C.F.R. § 503.16 (2015); Foreign Labor Certification News, supra note 11; Telephone
Interview with Ali Stabler, supra note 14; Telephone Interview with Claudia Palzkill, supra note 111;
Email from Colleen Dubbee, supra note 111.
170

171

SUKTHANKAR, supra note 36, at 34.

Telephone Interview with Ali Stabler, supra note 14; Telephone Interview with Claudia
Palzkill, supra note 111; Balgamwalla, Jobs Looking for People, supra note 14, at 487–88.
172

Common Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://j1visa.state.gov/basics/common-questions/
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
173
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improve diplomacy and goodwill abroad, the J-1 program allows participants to
work and study in the U.S. for a temporary period before returning to their home
countries.174 J-1 visitors pay a fee to a private “sponsor agency” approved by the
DOS, which then handles the logistics of work placement and travel.175
The program has enjoyed an overwhelmingly positive response from
students, their U.S. coworkers, and employers alike.176 Over 300,000 “foreign
visitors” enter the U.S. on the J-1 visa annually, 86% of whom are under the age
of thirty.177 In 2017, just over 1,800 Summer Work Travel (SWT) participants
entered Wyoming; of those, 1,454 worked in Teton County or Yellowstone
National Park.178 However, the J-1 program is not without its critics, and reports
of employer and recruiter abuses are not uncommon.179 Since the program is
overseen by the DOS rather than the DOL, however, labor concerns, including
wage and hour abuses and other violations of U.S. labor law, are frequently
overlooked.180 Employers have taken advantage of the loose oversight by ignoring
the flimsy guidelines of the J-1 program, overworking and underpaying their
young “ambassadors.”181
As the procedural guidelines for obtaining H-2B workers have tightened,
Wyoming employers have begun considering the J-1 program as a substitute
EUREKAFACTS, SUMMER WORK TRAVEL (SWT): PROGRAM REVIEW 1, 9 (2017); J-1 Visa
Basics, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://j1visa.state.gov/basics/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
174

175

22 C.F.R. §§ 62.3, 62.9, 62.11 (2015).

EUREKAFACTS, supra note 174, at 5 –7; Telephone Interview with Phil Simon, Vice
President, Work Exch. Programs, Council on Int’l Educ. Exch. (Jan. 18, 2018).
176

Facts and Figures, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://j1visa.state.gov/basics/facts-and-figures/
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018). Almost one third of J-1 participants enter the U.S. through the SWT
program. Id.
177

178
SWT-Participants-by-Zip-Code-2017, U.S DEP’T.
http://j1visa.state.gov/swt-participants-by-zip-code-2017/.

OF

STATE (Sept. 1, 2017, 9:22 PM),

JERRY KAMMER, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDIES, CHEAP LABOR AS CULTURAL EXCHANGE: THE
$100 MILLION SUMMER WORK TRAVEL INDUSTRY 20–21 (2011), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/
SWT-Report.pdf; Julia Preston, Foreign Students in Work Visa Program Stage Walkout at Plant,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/us/18immig.html (detailing
the strike of 400 J-1 students after being subjected to brutal working conditions, sub-minimum
wages, wage withholding, and complete lack of cultural exchange); Yuki Noguchi, U.S. Probes
Abuse Allegations Under Worker Visa Program, NPR (Mar. 18, 2013, 3:21 AM), http://www.npr.
org/2013/03/18/174410945/u-s-probes-abuse-allegations-under-worker-visa-program.
179

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., NO. ISP-I-12-15, 24 (2012) (“The OIG
team questions the appropriateness of allowing what are essentially work programs to masquerade
as cultural exchange activities. If categories of the J visa program are not primarily cultural exchange
programs, they should have a different visa designation and either be transferred to another Federal
agency that has the requisite expertise or be discontinued altogether.”).
180

181
Janie A. Chuang, The U.S. Au Pair Program: Labor Exploitation and the Myth of Cultural
Exchange, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 269, 290–93, 298–99 (2013); Nicole Durkin, Note, All Work
and Not Enough Pay: Proposing a New Statutory and Regulatory Framework to Curb Employer Abuse of
the Summer Work Travel Program, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1311–13 (2013).
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source of labor. But using a cultural program to replace the demand for low-skilled,
seasonal foreign workers puts both the J-1 program and the H-2B program at
risk.182 The J-1 program is not designed to fill the labor needs that Teton County
demands. As a cultural exchange meant to cultivate goodwill, placing students in
traditional “back of house” positions, where they have little to no interaction with
other Americans or visitors, subverts the goals the program purports to achieve.183
Even the nomenclature of the two visa categories—J-1 exchange “visitors” and
H-2B guest “workers”—reflects the fundamental differences in the aims of each
program. To replace one model with the other is to warp the meaning of the J-1
program and to simultaneously subordinate the interests of Wyoming employers,
Wyoming workers, and foreign guest workers alike.

B. The J-1 Program: Equally Ripe for Abuse, with Even Fewer Protections 184
The J-1 program is not designed for or capable of handling U.S. employers’
demand for labor.185 The DOS’s aim with the J-1 program is to grant students
cultural experiences rather than to protect them against labor abuses.186 As such,
students are not afforded even the tenuous guarantees of the H-2B program.187
Even though sponsor agencies have a stake in ensuring J-1 visitors have positive
experiences, their funding derives from payments from the J-1s themselves,
creating an incentive for sponsors to overlook complaints and maintain a steady
stream of paying participants.188 Risk of employer abuse, compounded by the
consistent, urgent need for seasonal workers, puts J-1 visitors in a vulnerable
position, especially when the sponsor agency exists in a constant conflict
of interest.189

182
Balgamwalla, Jobs Looking for People, supra note 14, at 487– 88. In 2016, oil field employers
in North Dakota turned to J-1 workers when importation of H-2B workers became too expensive.
Id. The DOS, in a rare intervention, suspended the J-1 program there, stating it was inconsistent
with the nature of the program’s goals. Id.

OWENS ET AL., supra note 46, at 1–14 (noting back-of-house “bad” jobs are usually given
to non-white employees); MEREDITH B. STEWART, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., CULTURE SHOCK: THE
EXPLOITATION OF J-1 CULTURAL EXCHANGE WORKERS 11 (2014), http://www.splcenter.org/20140201/
culture-shock-exploitation-j-1-cultural-exchange-workers.
183

184

THE INT’L LABOR RECRUITMENT WORKING GRP., supra note 64, at 27.

185

Id. at 3.

186
Id. at 11, 13–15. In fact, the loose program guidelines do not prohibit placing participants
in industries where they will be at heightened risk of human trafficking. See 22 C.F.R. 62.32(g)(8).
The rules recommend only that sponsors use “extra caution” when placing participants in these
industries. Id.
187

THE INT’L LABOR RECRUITMENT WORKING GRP., supra note 64, at 4–5.

Id. 12–13; Proposed Rule Changes Won’t End Abuses of Cultural Exchange Program, S. POVL. CTR. (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/02/27/splc-proposed-rulechanges-won’t-end-abuse-cultural-exchange-program.
188

ERTY

189

Stewart, supra note 183, at 12.
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Sponsor agencies that act as proxies for the DOL in overseeing the J-1 program
often fail to protect participants and employers.190 By shifting responsibility
for disputes that may arise over the course of the visa to the sponsor agencies,
the DOS deters J-1 visitors from filing formal complaints directly with the
government.191 But “weak regulations undermine oversight,” and between 2006
and 2012, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) only sanctioned
twenty-one sponsor agencies—five agencies per year.192 When higher sanctions
were recommended by the immediate reviewing sub-agency, they were often
overruled.193 The government has admitted that the DOS’s lack of funding and
personnel “renders ongoing, systematic oversight of sponsor compliance virtually
impossible.”194 Furthermore, employers, even if sanctioned by the DOS, are not
precluded from continued participation in the Summer Work Travel program.195
In 2009, fifteen of the major thirty-nine sponsors were in violation of program
rules, including failing to perform criminal background checks on placement
sites.196 The DOS acknowledged that allowing offending sponsors to continue
with the program led to secondary-school and college-aged students being placed
with known sex offenders, convicted murderers, and other felons.197
Although, on paper, the J-1 visa is portable, logistical concerns regarding the
feasibility of transferring job placements, such as the short length of the program
and unequal bargaining power between J-1 visitor and employer, make transfer
unrealistic.198 As with the H-2B program, this lack of realistic portability decreases
the likelihood of a J-1 participant speaking up or reporting labor abuses.199 In
some categories of the J-1 visa, such as the au pair program, which places an

190

Id. at 13–14.

Id. at 4. Even the sponsor agencies, however, show reluctance to intervene in the face of
a dispute between the J-1 visitor and the placement. Id. One au pair sponsor’s “suggestion” in the
face of a dispute was: “Talking really helps! Many problems and misunderstandings can be avoided
if host families and au pairs talk things over right from the start.” Changing Host Families, AU PAIR
WORLD, http://www.aupairworld.com/en/au_pair/change_family (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
191

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 180, at 23. The Office for
Private Sector Exchange (EC), housed under the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA),
is directly responsible for monitoring the J-1 program. Id. at 22.
192

193

Id. at 22–23.

194

Id. at 24.

195

Id. at 26.

196

Id.

197

Id. at 23–24.

Zach Kopplin, They Think We Are Slaves, POLITICO (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.politico.
com/magazine/story/2017/03/au-pair-program-abuse-state-department-214956; POLARIS PROJECT,
supra note 45, at 9.
198

JUST. IN MOTION, U.S. TEMPORARY FOREIGN VISA WORKERS: J-1 11 (2015), http://static1.
squarespace.com/static/57d09e5c5016e1b4f21c9bd3/t/58c3298bc534a58f937f057d/1489185167093/
VisaPages_J1_2015update.pdf.
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exchange visitor in a home as a nanny for the family’s children, a visa holder can
ask to be “reassigned.”200 However, power dynamics often leave young workers
uncomfortable or incapable of speaking up, especially if the placement is their
first formal job.201
Importantly, J-1 visitors bear the burden of all travel and arrangements to live
and work in the United States.202 In 2012, J-1 summer work travel participants
spent an average of $1,100 in arranging for the program, but anecdotal evidence
indicates that many exchange visitors pay exorbitant rates between three and ten
times this amount.203 Thus, wage and hour abuses of the J-1 visa are especially
egregious when coupled with these onerous travel and arrangement costs,
and may result in students going into crushing debt in the name of “cultural
exchange.”204 Such financial pressures additionally subject J-1 participants to
trafficking.205 Indeed, at highest risk for trafficking among housekeepers are
foreign women who entered the U.S. on H-2B or J-1 visas.206 From an employer’s
perspective, acquiring a cheap supply of labor that is exempt from Medicaid, Social
Security, and unemployment taxes provides strong financial incentive to rely on
J-1 visitors.207
“[E]mployers treat these visas interchangeably, substituting reliance on one
for another as circumstances—such as increased oversight here, or additional fees
there—dictate.”208 Employer needs may get the best of the J-1 program, which
would replace one vulnerable population (H-2B guest workers) with another
(J-1 exchange visitors).209 Such a shift in reliance on temporary worker visas will
overwhelm the J-1 program, which already exposes participants to abuse. The
program should not be expanded before guaranteeing that J-1 participants have

200

22 C.F.R. § 62.42 (2016) (governing the transfer of J visas).

201

Chuang, supra note 181, at 305–08.

22 C.F.R. § 62.32(b) (2018). Unlike the H-2B program, wherein the sponsoring employer
absorbs the costs. 29 C.F.R. § 503.16 (2015).
202

203
KAMMER, supra note 179, at 1 (noting that J-1 participants generate over $100 million
yearly for sponsor agencies, and millions for the State Department through visa fees); STEWART,
supra note 183, at 3, 8; JUST. IN MOTION, supra note 199, at 30–31.

Sayoni Maitra, Note, The Sweetest Visa on Earth? Protecting the Rights of J-1 Students in the
U.S. Summer Work Travel Program, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 859, 878 (2013).
204

205
Patricia Medige & Catherine G. Bowman, The U.S. Anti-Trafficking Policy and the J-1 Visa
Program: The State Department’s Challenge from Within, 7 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 103,
137 (2012).
206

POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 45, at 43, 45.

207

SUKTHANKAR, supra note 36, at 22.

208

Id. at 9.

209

Id. at 34–35.
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at least the same labor rights as other temporary work visa categories.210 Wyoming
employers should not be tempted to exploit another class of nonimmigrants and
should instead encourage national reform of the H-2B program so that it becomes
a more portable program that could strike an appropriate balance between meeting
employer needs and protecting foreign workers’ rights.

V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
One-time expansions of the H-2B visa ceiling, as Congress enacted in 2017,
do not remedy the systemic discriminatory issues endemic to the temporary
non-agricultural guest worker program and, instead, focus only on maintaining
human supply flows to needy employers.211 To enact meaningful reform, the entire
temporary guest worker program must be replaced rather than expanded. In its
place, Congress should enact a program that acknowledges the contributions of
women beyond the domestic realm. Such a program should relax the absolute
requirement that the visa be tied to one employer, hold employers accountable
by enforcing meaningful penalties for violations, and offer a provisional pathway
to citizenship.212 Doing so would strengthen local economies and reduce the
likelihood of employers turning to the under-regulated J-1 program to supplant
valid labor needs.
First, revamping the H-2B visa so that it offers even minimal portability
would protect guest workers, pressure employers to treat their workers better,
and would also be more responsive to fluctuating labor needs. Several scholars
describe such a model as a “provisional visa.”213 A provisional visa, for example,
could be valid for up to three years and portable after twelve months, with the
understanding that the worker may be interested in long-term immigration.214
Tethering guest workers to their sponsoring employer for twelve months allows
employers to recoup their expenditures in the visa process.215 It also encourages

210
Id. at 34 (noting that “in spite of advocacy efforts, [the problem] is that the visas are
essentially interchangeable, and employers are able to shift easily from reliance on one category
to another.”).

Foreign Labor Certification News, supra note 11. Labor shortages are an ongoing and
persistent problem. Id.
211

212
Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 124, at 74 n.118; J. WILSON, supra note 109 (outlining the
2013 “W-visa” proposal); NEW AM. ECON., supra note 153, at 26.
213
DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., ALIGNING TEMPORARY
IMMIGRATION VISAS WITH US LABOR MARKET NEEDS: THE CASE FOR A NEW SYSTEM OF PROVISIONAL
VISAS 13 (2009).
214

Id.

See id. USCIS could waive this requirement if an employee could show mistreatment by an
employer. See id.
215

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol18/iss2/5

26

DeSanto: Beauty and the H-2Beast: How the Equality State Fails its Female

2018

COMMENT

347

paying laborers well enough to dissuade them from quitting for an employer who
may offer better wages or working conditions at the end of the one-year period.216
After years of insufficient oversight of employers by the DOL, the H-2B
program needs an alternative method to ensure compliance. Harnessing internal
pressure within an industry, a pressure that would come from allowing guest
workers to change employers, has the potential to encourage employers to
treat workers better. Increased portability would provide agency to an abused
guest worker and would channel employers into compliance in a way that the
empty threats of DOL sanctions or penalties never have.217 Although calling for
increased staff and higher budgets within the DOL may improve oversight, the
DOL has admitted its susceptibility to industry lobbyists and its reluctance to
enforce meaningful sanctions against offending employers.218 Since the DOL
has demonstrated ineptitude in managing H-2B employers, calling for increased
oversight is optimistic yet futile; however, reform in the way of a provisional visa
may serve as a substitute for an effective enforcement entity.
Next, offering a pathway to citizenship for nonimmigrants who arrive on
the H-2B visa would have an significant impact on women.219 Remedial visas,
valuable as they may be, cast women as victims of specific crimes, are frequently
delayed and rarely granted, and are not particularly suited to H-2B women’s
experiences.220 Reforming the H-2B visa to provide a long-term option for
citizenship should be contingent on the same strict qualifications as other green
card categories.221 Offering an affirmative option for stable immigration status
would be especially valuable as an honest reflection of migrant women in the
21st century: agents of their own lives and capable of making decisions regarding
their citizenship without having to wait for a paternalistic state to intervene and
retroactively offer relief for an assault or other crime.222
Furthermore, a pathway to citizenship would legitimize the already-substantial
social and cultural contributions that temporary guest workers bring to the U.S.
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To begin, many H-2B visa holders lucky enough to find non-exploitive employment in the U.S. return annually—including H-2B workers in Wyoming.223
Offering a pathway to citizenship would reduce the likelihood of H-2B workers
entering the stream of undocumented immigrants by overstaying their visas or
leaving abusive employers and remaining in the U.S.—a problem precipitated
by the structure of the current visa.224 Such a shift would raise the floor for
U.S. employees as well, who would no longer be undercut by debt-ridden
foreign workers.225
The knowledge that attaining a green card is possible would also reduce
familial strain and could lead to “long-term investment” in communities, such as
home-buying, entrepreneurship, vocational classes, and other ways of exercising
individual mobility.226 Bringing certainty to immigration status would promote
social and civic integration. For example, there would be greater incentive to learn
English, which might otherwise seem futile for a guest worker whose temporary
status is always in flux.227
For Wyoming, providing a pathway to citizenship would bring immense
economic benefits.228 Immigrants currently eligible to naturalize in Wyoming,
not including current H-2B workers, could earn an additional $18 million in
aggregate yearly wages, as naturalization raises an average worker’s wage 8-11%.229
With increased wages comes higher contribution to state and federal taxes, money
that would be reapportioned into municipal services that raise the standard of
living for all Wyoming residents.230 Higher earning power also translates into
increased spending power, which would benefit local businesses and improve job
and educational opportunities for new citizens.231
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VI. CONCLUSION
Wyoming applies for a large number of temporary guest worker visas annually;
the inability to find a local workforce willing to take low-skilled, low-paying jobs
has created a true dependence on the H-2B visa.232 Wyoming employers are at
the mercy of an already-broken system and often turn to H-2B visas in the face
of labor and housing shortages, despite the H-2B’s cumbersome bureaucratic
requirements.233 Such reliance subjects female workers to disproportionate risks.234
Allowing for a pathway to citizenship would sever the dependent relationship
Wyoming employers have on the fickle visa certification system and would
provide a more stable labor pool.235 In return, H-2B workers would finally enjoy
the health, safety, and wage protections that are so severely lacking or ignored
in the current system.236 Finally, a pathway would reduce the temptation for
employers to turn to the J-1 exchange program as an easily exploitable source of
labor.237 Increasing protections and flexibility of the H-2B program will prevent a
new class of vulnerable workers from experiencing the same abuses as the H-2B.

Id. at 18 (“Given that it is expensive and cumbersome for employers to obtain labor
certs—and similarly daunting to formally apply for an H-1B visa—the large interest in all these visa
categories indicates Wyoming employers likely were having real trouble finding the workers they
needed on U.S. soil.”).
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